A story has been circulating, asserted confidently in some quarters, that the United States struck Venezuela on January 3, 2026, seized Nicolás Maduro, and announced plans to “run” the country during a transition. Whether framed as breaking news or treated as fait accompli, the narrative is revealing regardless of its factual status. It exposes how readily we reach for an old explanatory crutch, the petrodollar. The claim goes like this, Washington, fearing de-dollarization, used force to reassert control over oil and thereby defend the dollar’s supremacy.
That reading is seductive. It is also wrong.
To see why, it helps to separate myth from
mechanism and to ground the analysis in history, real, documented cases where
oil, currency, and U.S. power intersected. When we do, a different picture
emerges, one in which spectacle, domestic politics, and performative dominance
matter far more than any coherent strategy to “save” the dollar.
Start with the petrodollar mythos itself. Yes,
in the mid-1970s the U.S. and Saudi Arabia struck arrangements that entrenched
dollar invoicing in global oil trade. And yes, “petrodollar recycling” channelled
oil exporters’ surpluses into U.S. Treasuries, helping finance American
deficits. But even at its peak, oil pricing was never the sole pillar of dollar
dominance. The dollar prevailed because the United States offered what others
could not, deep and liquid capital markets, a credible legal system, and
unmatched financial infrastructure.
History is instructive here. When Iraq under
Saddam Hussein switched some oil sales to euros in 2000, it did not dent the
dollar’s reserve status. The euro did not surge, the dollar did not fall.
Likewise, when Libya experimented with non-dollar oil transactions in the
2000s, global currency markets barely noticed. These episodes mattered
symbolically, not structurally. Currency hegemony is not a light switch you
flip by changing the invoicing unit of a few million barrels a day.
Contrast that with moments when the dollar
truly wobbled. The Nixon Shock of 1971, ending gold convertibility, was a
monetary event, not an oil war. The Volcker shock of the early 1980s, which
restored confidence in the dollar through punishing interest rates, had nothing
to do with crude supply. More recently, the dollar’s resilience after the 2008
financial crisis rested on the Federal Reserve’s role as global dollar lender
of last resort, not on any assertion of control over hydrocarbons. When stress
hits, the world runs toward dollar liquidity, not toward oil fields.
Oil itself has also changed position in the
hierarchy of power. The 1973 oil embargo could bring advanced economies to
their knees, the 2020 pandemic oil crash could not. Electrification, efficiency
gains, and diversified energy portfolios have reduced the leverage of any
single producer. The United States, now one of the world’s largest oil
producers, is less vulnerable to supply shocks than at any point since World
War II. If oil were still the master lever of monetary power, the shale
revolution would have translated into an unassailable petrodollar renaissance.
It didn’t, because the lever no longer works that way.
What has
changed, and where real pressure on U.S. financial power exists, is payments
architecture. This is where de-dollarization actually lives. China’s
Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) has grown steadily as a renminbi
clearing layer. The BIS-backed mBridge project has demonstrated real-time,
atomic settlement across central bank digital currencies. These systems don’t
require oil, coups, or airstrikes. They require code, coordination, and patient
institutional buy in. History again offers a parallel, SWIFT did not become
dominant because NATO bombed Brussels, it became dominant because banks
voluntarily joined the most efficient network available.
Venezuela’s role in this landscape is often
overstated. It does hold vast reserves. over 300 billion barrels by common
estimates, and it has talked loudly about escaping the dollar, pricing oil in
yuan, and aligning with BRICS-adjacent initiatives. But talk is not
transformation. Venezuela’s production capacity has been crippled for years by
mismanagement and sanctions. Even at full tilt, Venezuelan crude cannot anchor
a new monetary order. If controlling barrels were sufficient, Russia, one of
the world’s top energy exporters, would not feel pressure to build alternative
payment rails, oil wealth alone has not insulated it from financial sanctions.
This is where the rhetoric attributed to U.S.
officials in the circulating story matters more than the mechanics. The
emphasis was not on balance of payments stability or reserve composition. It
was on “getting the oil flowing,” “capturing” a leader, and “running” a
country. That language echoes past interventions driven less by systemic
necessity than by political theatre.
Consider Panama in 1989. Manuel Noriega was
removed under the banner of drug enforcement and democracy, but the operation
also served as a dramatic assertion of U.S. dominance at the end of the Cold
War. It was fast, overwhelming, and symbolic. It did not secure a currency
regime or an economic doctrine, it secured a moment. Or look at Iraq in 2003.
The war was sold on weapons of mass destruction, later reframed around
democracy, and endlessly speculated about oil. Yet two decades on, the invasion
weakened U.S. legitimacy, destabilized a region, and did nothing to fortify
dollar hegemony. If anything, it accelerated global scepticism about American
stewardship.
Even the narcotics pretext, often invoked in
Latin American interventions, has a thin empirical record. In the 1980s, drug
rhetoric justified militarization from Colombia to Panama without reducing U.S.
demand or overdose deaths. Today, the opioid crisis is driven primarily by
synthetic drugs produced and trafficked through networks far removed from
Venezuelan territory. History shows that “drug wars” abroad are politically
useful narratives at home, not effective strategies.
Seen through this lens, the Venezuela story, real
or rumoured, fits a familiar pattern. Oil becomes a prop. Currency becomes a
post-hoc justification. The underlying logic is exhibitionist, demonstrate
power, punish defiance, create a made for television victory. That is politics
of spectacle, not monetary statecraft.
And the irony is sharp. If the lesson absorbed
by the rest of the world is that challenging U.S. financial dominance invites
coercion, the rational response is not submission, it is diversification. After
the freezing of Russian reserves in 2022, central banks openly discussed
reducing exposure to dollar assets. That debate did not require bombs, it
required precedent. Force, far from preserving hegemony, can hasten the search
for exits.
The dollar remains dominant because it is
useful, liquid, and embedded in institutions people trust. Those qualities
cannot be enforced at gunpoint. They can only be maintained by law, openness,
and predictability. History tells us that when empires confuse spectacle for
strategy, they win headlines and lose foundations.
If
the goal were truly to defend the dollar, the battlefield would be regulatory
standards, financial plumbing, and digital rails, not Caracas. You can seize a
refinery. You can even topple a government. But you cannot bomb a payment
protocol.
Cheers.
ravivarmmankkanniappan@12520501263.1491° N, 101.6534° E
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Even Gaddafi was brutally killed because he dared to challenge the use of USD in oil trade.
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